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 ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE POLITICS 
OF PRINCIPLE  
HEATHER COX RICHARDSON*
For decades, Americans have perceived President Abraham Lincoln 
as either a principled crusader for African-American rights or a crafty 
politician.  Lincoln was, certainly, deeply principled as well as a brilliant 
politician, but his sights were not focused on either racial equality or 
political dominance.  Horrified by what he believed was a Democratic 
attempt to hijack the government in the interests of an economic elite, 
Lincoln envisioned a new kind of American politics that would 
guarantee economic advancement for all.  His approach dominated the 
actions of the Republican Party during the Civil War, when party 
members created a new activist American government which sponsored 
economic progress for individuals: its measures included homestead 
legislation, the creation of the Department of Agriculture, and the 
Land-Grant College Act. 
 
At the time of his death, Lincoln did not leave a secure political 
legacy behind.  His approach came under immediate attack by President 
Andrew Johnson, a former Democrat who used his veto of Congress’s 
1866 extension of the Freedmen’s Bureau to reject government support 
for Southern homesteads and badly needed Southern schools; Johnson 
incorrectly called their contemplated establishment an unprecedented 
use of government power.  In response to that assault, the Republican 
Party split between those calling for a return to old party systems and 
those clinging to the new ways.  By 1890, machine Republicans had won 
the struggle, and it seemed that Lincoln’s new approach was dead. 
This was misleading.  We can now see that Lincoln left a legacy of a 
new vision of American politics, a vision that reformers have used ever 
since to challenge an entrenched political and economic elite. 
I.  LINCOLN AND BIPARTISAN POLITICS 
Abraham Lincoln began his political life as a Whig.  This party 
identification was no small thing for his later political development.  The 
Whigs are remembered today primarily for their support for internal 
 
* Professor of History, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
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improvements and domestic manufacturing, but their focus on 
developing the country was not isolated.  It was, in fact, a reflection of 
their larger belief in a “nonpartisan” government, a government that 
acted in the best interests of all the citizens of the country, regardless of 
party.1
In reality, of course, that non-partisanship was an illusion.  The 
Whigs promoted the economic development that benefited their 
primary constituency, the urban professionals and businessmen who 
needed better transportation systems and safer harbors for their ships so 
that they could transport goods more easily.  But Lincoln’s Whig 
background made him a good candidate to become a politician who 
called for a new kind of politics.
 
2
The Whigs’ purported “nonpartisanship” gave them an 
understanding of larger societal interests and a language to support 
them that Democrats did not have.  For the Democrats, formed by the 
nation’s first generation of professional politicians, men such as Martin 
Van Buren, politics were about party, and about advancing the party’s 
interest though patronage and power.  Only by attaching individuals to 
the machinery of politics could the nation command their allegiance, 
Democrats argued.  In practice, the two parties were similar, but in 
rhetoric and ideas, they were very different.
 
3
In the 1850s, many Northerners came to believe that the Democratic 
Party was actively working for the rich.  Southern slave owners, the 
leaders of the Democratic Party and the wealthiest men in America, 
seemed intent on controlling the national government.  Northerners had 
begun to worry about the growing power of Southerners in government 
with the 1844 election of Southern Democrat James K. Polk.
 
4
 
1. See generally DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE 
AMERICAN WHIGS 16, 18–19, 21–22 (1979).  On the Whig mindset and Lincoln, see id. at 264. 
  Polk had 
run on the promise that he would take Texas and all of the territory that 
both the United States and Great Britain claimed in the Pacific 
Northwest, up to the line of 54° 40’.  Once in office, though, Polk 
quickly came to a settlement with Britain establishing the 49th parallel 
as the northern boundary of the United States, a boundary that gave the 
enormously valuable Vancouver ports to Britain.  Almost as quickly, the 
President went to war with Mexico over Texas, embroiling the country 
2. Id. at 273, 275. 
3. Id. at 23–42.   
4. MICHAEL S. GREEN, POLITICS AND AMERICA IN CRISIS 1–4 (2010). 
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in a war that most interpreted as a way to get more territory for 
Southern expansion.5
Events of the 1850s only exacerbated Northern suspicions that 
Southern slave owners wanted to control the national government.  In 
1854, Illinois Democrat Stephen A. Douglas introduced in the Senate a 
bill to organize the western Territory of Nebraska in order to promote a 
transcontinental railroad through it.  But while Northerners of all 
parties liked the idea of westward expansion, there was a hitch to the 
Nebraska plan.  Southern Senators told Douglas in no uncertain terms 
that they would never permit the organization of a new non-slave-
holding Territory without a corresponding slave-holding one.  Eager to 
get Nebraska organized one way or another, Douglas agreed.  He added 
to his bill a plan for organizing the Territory of Kansas without 
restriction on slavery in it.
 
6
The problem with this plan was that the Kansas Territory lay on the 
northern side of the Missouri Compromise line, which had divided the 
newly acquired Louisiana territory between slavery and freedom.  In the 
thirty-four years since the passage of the compromise, Northerners had 
watched the South settle all the land that fell to it under the plan and 
then, when that ran out, involve the nation in a war to take more land 
from Mexico.  Now, just as Northerners began to spread into their half 
of the territory, Southerners abruptly changed the rules.
 
7  Northerners 
howled.  Stephen Douglas remarked that he could travel from Boston to 
Chicago by the light of his own burning effigies.8
This bill struck horror into the hearts of Northerners.  It was not so 
much that they opposed slavery: most did not care one way or another 
about the fate of African Americans.  Rather, they believed that free 
workers could not compete against slaves, who could be forced to work 
with less food, poorer housing, and less medical care than free workers 
would endure.
 
9
 
5. Id. at 5–13. 
  Southern planters wanted to spread the slave system, 
Northerners believed, because it would enable them to dominate the 
Western economy the same way they dominated the Southern.  
Eventually, the competition of slave labor would force free workers 
into, at best, a quasi-slavery of their own, dependent on the wealthy for 
6. Id. at 67–71.  
7. WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL WAR AMERICA: 
A BIOGRAPHY 49–51 (2002). 
8. GREEN, supra note 4, at 74. 
9. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE GREATEST NATION OF THE EARTH: 
REPUBLICAN ECONOMIC POLICIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR 24–27 (1997). 
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whatever pittance they could get for their work.  No longer would a 
hard-working man be able to rise.10
It seemed that Southern leaders would stop at nothing to spread 
their economic grasp across the country.  Despite the bill’s unpopularity 
in the North, Democratic President Franklin Pierce put enormous 
pressure on Democratic Congressmen to pass the Kansas–Nebraska 
Bill.  They caved.  Like other Northerners, Abraham Lincoln saw the 
passage of this measure as evidence that Southerners were bent on 
dominating the government for their own economic interest.
 
11  Evidence 
of a slave owners’ plot to control the government continued to mount.  
In the effort to organize the Kansas Territory, where the settlers were 
staunchly anti-slavery, Pierce tried to ram a pro-slavery government 
down the unwilling settlers’ throats.  When Massachusetts Senator 
Charles Sumner protested the “Crime Against Kansas” on the floor of 
the Senate in May 1856, Congressman Preston Brooks of South 
Carolina beat Sumner unconscious with a cane as the Senator sat writing 
letters at his desk on the Senate floor.  While Sumner hovered between 
life and death, exultant Southerners feted Brooks, his attacker.12  Then, 
in 1857, the Southern-dominated Supreme Court under Chief Justice 
Roger Taney pronounced the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional 
and declared that Congress had no power to legislate concerning slavery 
in the Territories.13  This infamous Dred Scott decision seemingly 
opened the way for the slave system all over the new West, which, 
thanks to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ending the Mexican 
War, included much of the land that is now the lower forty-eight of the 
United States.  The new Democratic President, James Buchanan, 
cheerfully announced that the Supreme Court had settled the vexing 
question of slavery in the Territories.14
Most Northerners disagreed.  In the famous 1858 “House Divided” 
speech, which launched his Senate candidacy, Lincoln portrayed the 
leaders of the march toward slavery as carpenters building a house, and 
charged that Stephen (Douglas), Franklin (Pierce), Roger (Taney), and 
James (Buchanan) were turning the nation into a house of slavery.
 
15
 
10. See id. at 210. 
  
11. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 168–71 (1995). 
12. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 278–311 (1960).  
13. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  See generally DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE (1978). 
14. See GREEN, supra note 4, at 109–18. 
15. GIENAPP, supra note 7, at 60–61. 
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Lincoln spoke for a new party, the Republican Party, which had begun 
to organize in opposition to what seemed to be the destruction of 
American liberty by Southern slave owners determined to control the 
American economy. 
In 1858, leading Southern politician James Henry Hammond 
explained to the Senate the slave owners’ version of how American 
politics and economics worked.16  Of course the South controlled the 
country, he said, and well it should.  It was the wealthiest part of the 
nation, and it alone had figured out a true system of political economy.  
At the bottom of society, there would always be a class of drudges: 
stupid, unskilled workers who were strong, docile, and loyal to their 
betters.  On this “mud-sill” rested all of higher civilization, those 
gentlemen who lead “progress, civilization, and refinement.”17  Members 
of the lowest class were born into their way of life, were “happy, 
content, unaspiring, and utterly incapable, from intellectual weakness, 
ever to give us any trouble by their aspirations.”18  They could not 
possibly rise.  Indeed, if they did so, all of human society would be 
perverted since, given a say in society, they would inevitably demand a 
more equal division of wealth.  Hammond explained that the South had 
defined its “mud-sill” class by race, but warned Northerners that they, 
too, had such a class.  “[Y]our whole hireling class of manual laborers 
and ‘operatives,’ . . . are essentially slaves.”19
Abraham Lincoln denied that the government should be yoked to 
the wealthy through partisan rule.  Instead, he charted a new direction 
for the American government.  In his striking speech to the Wisconsin 
Agricultural Fair on September 30, 1859, Lincoln explained his vision of 
how America should work.  Taking on Hammond, he destroyed the 
premise that some men could never rise, that they were destined forever 
to be the mudsill of society.
  Hammond insisted that his 
way was the true genius of America, enshrined in the Constitution.  
Hammond stood firm on the nation’s basic law, believing that the 
American government must protect slave property to support an 
economic elite. 
20
 
16. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68, 71 (1858). 
  Instead, Lincoln outlined a worldview that 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, SENTINEL (Milw., Wis.), Oct. 1, 1859, reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 471 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953) [hereinafter 
COLLECTED WORKS]. 
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would stand against that of Hammond, and that would become the heart 
of the fledgling Republican Party. 
In Milwaukee, Lincoln told his audience of farmers that all economic 
wealth came from labor, that “capital is the fruit of labor, and could 
never have existed if labor had not first existed.”21  A healthy American 
society worked so that “[t]he prudent, penniless beginner in the world, 
labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land, 
for himself; then labors on his own account another while, and at length 
hires another new beginner to help him.”22  This was the idea behind 
free labor, “the just and generous, and prosperous system, which opens 
the way for all—gives hope to all, and energy, and progress, and 
improvement of condition to all.”23
But Lincoln did not stop, as he could easily have done, with assuring 
farmers that hard-working producers were the backbone of the 
American system.  He went on to call for education to help every man 
use his labor most efficiently, to help them rise more quickly and 
further.  This was not idle on his part, and it was not necessarily popular.  
Nineteenth-century Americans, especially those in the West, often 
scoffed at “book learning” and insisted that the only way to learn 
farming was in the field.
 
24
Those who believed that workers were the mudsill of society wanted 
their workers uneducated, with strong backs and weak minds.  To this, 
Lincoln responded, “Free Labor says ‘no!’”
  Lincoln had lived with this prejudice in his 
own life, and must have thought long and hard before including his call 
in a speech to an audience, especially a hard-drinking audience (as many 
of the fairgoers surely were), that was unlikely to agree. 
25  A man’s brain guides, 
directs, and protects his labor, and every mind “should be cultivated, 
and improved, by whatever will add to its capacity for performing its 
charge.”26  “In one word,” Lincoln somewhat imprecisely thundered, 
“free labor insists on universal education.”27  The world was changing, 
he explained, and people would need to be able to farm intelligently, 
“deriving a comfortable subsistence from the smallest area of soil.”28
 
21. Id. at 478. 
  
22. Id. at 478–79. 
23. Id. 
24. RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 157. 
25. Lincoln, supra note 20, at 479. 
26. Id. at 480. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 481. 
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Only this could prevent oppression, whether from “crowned-kings, 
money-kings, [or] land-kings.”29
While Hammond and his ilk rested their worldview on the 
Constitution’s protection of property, Lincoln looked instead to the 
ideas of equality outlined in the Declaration of Independence to create 
a new prosperous future.  “All men” were included in the Declaration of 
Independence, he insisted, and, when given an opportunity to create 
new societies in the West, it was imperative for a just and prosperous 
society that the principle of equality of opportunity be honored for 
every man.
 
30  He concluded his Milwaukee speech: “[B]y the best 
cultivation of the physical world, beneath and around us; and the 
intellectual and moral world within us, we shall secure an individual, 
social, and political prosperity and happiness, whose course shall be 
onward and upward, and which, while the earth endures, shall not pass 
away.”31
Lincoln’s concern about the growing power of Southern slave 
owners in the 1850s convinced him that the government must not 
privilege an economic elite.  Rather, it must leave the economic playing 
field free for hard-working individuals to rise.  By 1859, the idea of 
government support for individuals had combined with his conception 
of a “nonpolitical” politics to suggest that “equality” might mean 
something more active than simply staying out of the way of the man on 
the make.  For decades, men had called for government promotion of 
individual economic advancement, an idea that Republicans like 
Lincoln were ready to adopt. 
 
II.  WARTIME GOVERNMENT 
Lincoln’s tentative foray into the idea of advancing individual 
economic opportunity might well have gone unlaunched had it not been 
for the Civil War.  The need to finance the war effort helped to create 
an economically active government, while the war effort increased 
Democrats’ willingness to think in bipartisan ways.32
 
29. Id. 
  Much has been 
made of Lincoln’s appointment of rivals to his Cabinet, a move that 
certainly weakened his opponents and also gave Lincoln access to a 
30. Lincoln put this best in his speech at Alton, Illinois, during the 1858 Lincoln–
Douglas Debates.  See Seventh and Last Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Alton, Illinois, 
CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Oct. 15, 1858, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 20, at 297–
318. 
31. Lincoln, supra note 20, at 482. 
32. RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 8–15. 
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wide range of ideas.33
Lincoln left Congress in charge of producing legislation, and wartime 
congressional Republicans shared his economic vision of legislation to 
promote widespread economic advancement.  Their first job was to find 
money to fight the war.  When it became clear they could not raise 
enough money by selling war bonds, they imposed new national taxes.
  His deliberate construction of a bipartisan 
cabinet, though, was also a reflection of a new approach to politics, one 
that would be based on the principle of universal economic opportunity 
rather than party. 
34  
By 1862, new comprehensive taxes covered virtually every product in 
America.35  In the same year, Congress imposed income taxes as well, 
graduating them according to different wealth levels.36
Republican Congressmen imposed taxes in the certainty that they 
must pay for the war as they went, or face terrible inflation, but they did 
not levy taxes in a vacuum.  They believed that they must develop 
policies enabling Americans to pay the new taxes.  In order to do that, 
they took a page from Lincoln’s book.  They believed that agriculture 
was the primary stage of economic development, farming the primary 
job for any man rising in American society.
 
37  A farmer would produce 
more than he and his family could consume and would thus accumulate 
capital or, as they called it, “preexerted labor.”38
For the Republicans, it seemed imperative for the government to 
speed up this fundamental economic process.  To do so, they started in 
an obvious place, with legislation to get people onto their own farms 
faster.  In 1862, Congress passed a bill offering a homestead of 160 acres 
to anyone who settled on it and farmed for five years.
  He would invest this 
capital in more land or by hiring workers, further increasing his stock of 
capital.  Thus, hard workers in America were part of a never-ending 
upward economic spiral. 
39
 
33. See, e.g., DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005). 
  A key argument 
for the Homestead Act was that it would prevent land monopolies in 
America, preventing the consolidation of wealth into a few hands.  
Instead, it would allow individuals not only to support their families, but 
to “contribute to the greatness and glory of the Republic,” developing 
34. RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 62–65.  
35. Id. at 126. 
36. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432. 
37. RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 140–43. 
38. Id. at 19. 
39. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392. 
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both economic production and “the elements of a higher and better 
civilization.”40  The Homestead Act would establish the free-labor 
model across the West, making it impossible for the “mud-sill” model of 
rich and poor to take hold in those new lands.41
Republicans utterly rejected the argument of opponents that 
“giving” away land was a welfare measure for the indigent.  Rather, it 
was a way to develop the economy for everyone.  “Every smoke rising 
from a new opening in the wilderness marks the foundation of a new 
feeder to Commerce and the Revenue,” Republican newspaper editor 
Horace Greeley explained.
 
42  To complaints that the government had no 
constitutional authority to meddle in the economy, Illinois Republican 
Owen Lovejoy retorted: “[W]hat is beneficial to the people cannot be 
detrimental to the Government; for in this country the interests of both 
are identical . . . .  With us the Government is simply an agency through 
which the people act for their own benefit.”43  Enough Democrats 
agreed that the homestead bill passed with bipartisan support in the 
House, and two Democrats crossed over to vote yes in the Senate.44
But Congress did not stop there.  As Lincoln had suggested in his 
Milwaukee speech, scientific knowledge would increase the efficiency of 
farming. Those anxious to increase development called for a 
Department of Agriculture to promote new farming techniques.
 
45  Every 
penny the government spent distributing agricultural information would 
come back threefold, supporters claimed.  In 1862, Congress passed a 
bipartisan bill establishing a Department of Agriculture to collect 
agricultural statistics and distribute information, seeds, and plants.46  To 
complaints that such an appropriation of money was unconstitutional, 
budget hawk William Pitt Fessenden responded that the country would 
be repaid in spades, “richly paid over and over again in absolute 
increase of wealth.  There is no doubt of that.”47
 
40. Galusha Grow, quoted in RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 147.  Grow, a Republican, 
was speaker of the House in the Thirty-seventh Congress and later known as “the father of 
the Homestead Law.”  Id. at 11. 
 
41. Id. at 147–48. 
42. DAILY TRIBUNE (N.Y.), Feb. 1, 1862, at 4, quoted in RICHARDSON, supra note 9, 
at 146. 
43. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 174 (1860). 
44. RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 148–49. 
45. Id. at 149–54. 
46. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387.  See also RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 
154. 
47. RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 154. 
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The capstone of the new program to advance individual economic 
progress came, as Lincoln had suggested it would, in the field of 
education.  In 1862, Congress passed a law offering to states 30,000 acres 
of unappropriated public land for each of a state’s senators and 
representatives, land that the states could sell to establish a permanent 
fund for supporting agricultural colleges.48  Higher education in America 
had always been the privilege of the wealthy, but this Land-Grant 
College Act, dubbed the Morrill Act after its main advocate Justin 
Smith Morrill, would make learning accessible to all young men.49  As 
individuals learned to make their labor more effective, they would 
“increase the prosperity of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce,” 
and guarantee that Americans would not fall behind well-educated 
Europeans, supporters argued.50  The passage of this bipartisan bill in 
July 1862 established the funding for the country’s state universities.51
This wartime legislation marked a new direction in government.  
The fledgling Republican Party was directing an activist federal 
government to promote widespread economic equality under the 
premise of nonpartisanship.
 
52
Nowhere was this new vision of government more evident than in 
Congress’s 1866 extension of the Freedmen’s Bureau, only a year after it 
had been created.
  This nonpartisanship was possible on 
account of Northerners’ strong support for the Union, which brought 
Democrats into the Republican fold, but also because Lincoln and 
farsighted members of the new party really saw the role of government 
as the advancement of a new free-labor society of individual, well-
educated workers. 
53
In 1866, Congress passed a bill that expanded the scope of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau to enable it to put impoverished black and white 
Southerners onto homesteads and to get the education that they so 
  When it became clear by late 1865 that recalcitrant 
Southern white employers would not pay freedmen the wages due them, 
and that Southern elites continued to control the Southern economy—
such as it was—Congress tried to jumpstart the Southern economy with 
a program mirroring the one it had tried in the North. 
 
48. Morrill Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-108, 12 Stat. 503. 
49. RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 154–60. 
50. Id. at 158. 
51. Id. at 154–55. 
52. On the political ramifications of nonpartisan rhetoric, see ADAM I.P. SMITH, NO 
PARTY NOW: POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR NORTH (2006). 
53. For a discussion of the 1865 act creating the Freedmen’s Bureau, see RICHARDSON, 
supra note 9, at 239–40.  
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sorely lacked.54  While today we generally know the Freedmen’s Bureau 
by this nickname, it was, in fact, named the Bureau of Refugees, 
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, and it helped white Southerners as 
well as freed people.  Republicans were eager to spread small farms 
across the South as they were doing across the North, and the 1866 bill 
provided for the President to appoint commissioners who would oversee 
the settlement of refugees and freedmen on homesteads.  The bill also 
provided for the commissioners to buy land and establish schools on it, 
funding them in a manner similar to that used for the land-grant 
colleges, with the caveat that the government could not sell land for less 
money than it had paid.55  Critically, Congress did not limit the 
operation of the measure to the states in rebellion, seeking to reach the 
black and poor white populations in the border states that had stayed 
loyal.56
Republicans considered this an uncontroversial bill, designed to 
repair the South from the damage inflicted on it by the monopolization 
of its resources by wealthy Southern slave owners.
 
57  It would integrate 
the South into a national free-labor economy which appeared so 
successful in the North and West.58
III.  POLITICS AS USUAL? 
 
The conviction that this was an obvious and uncontroversial piece of 
legislation did not reckon with the old-fashioned politics of Andrew 
Johnson.  Unlike Lincoln, Johnson had been a Democrat before the war 
and was steeped in Democratic conceptions of party politics as a divisive 
war.  The difference between his approach and that of the Lincoln 
Republicans showed up starkly as soon as Johnson assumed the 
presidency after Lincoln’s assassination.  While Republicans wanted to 
reintegrate Southern states into the Union slowly, after their economic 
systems stabilized, Johnson wanted Democrats back in the national 
government immediately.59
 
54. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, WEST FROM APPOMATTOX 45, 54–56 (2007). 
  Initially, he gave the impression of sharing 
Republicans’ dislike of Southern leaders when he refused amnesty to 
anyone who owned more than $20,000 worth of property, but it turned 
55. Thirty-Ninth Congress: Freedmen’s Bureau, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1866, at 5. 
56. Thirty-Ninth Congress: The Freedmen’s Bureau, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1866, at 5. 
57. RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 53–54. 
58. Thirty-Ninth Congress: The Amendment to the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
1866, at 1. 
59. RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 52. 
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out that this restriction was more posturing than principle.  In the 
summer of 1865, he pardoned more than 150 Southern leaders a day, 
and ultimately permitted Southern state governments to reorganize 
under the same leaders who had made up the prewar elite.60  In 
December 1865, Johnson cheerfully told Congress that Reconstruction 
was over and that all it had to do was to seat the South’s newly elected 
representatives.  Republicans found this prescription hard to swallow: 
those representatives were the very same men against whom they had 
organized their party in the 1850s.61
Johnson firmly believed in the old-fashioned rule of party.  From the 
very beginning of his assumption of the presidency, he worked hard to 
undercut the Republicans, returning Democrats to power as quickly as 
he possibly could, even if it meant siding with the South’s traditional 
leaders.
  Indeed, one of the men waiting to 
be seated in Congress was the former Confederate vice president, 
Alexander H. Stephens. 
62
Johnson issued an ultimatum to the Republican Party with his veto 
of the extension of the Freedmen’s Bureau.
  Worried about the power of the Republicans after the war, he 
saw government activism as politics, and did not want the passage of 
popular measures to bring more voters to the Republican ticket. 
63  Ignoring the work of the 
war years, Johnson announced in his veto message that homestead and 
education legislation was far beyond the scope of Congress’s authority.  
Johnson utterly rejected the Republican idea that the job of government 
was to promote the economic advancement of average Americans.64  He 
denied that legislation benefiting farmers and workers would help the 
nation, and insisted instead that homestead legislation was welfare for 
“indigent persons.”65  Further, he went on, the government “has never 
founded schools for any class of our own people,”66
Johnson thus rejected the role of government as a sponsor of 
individual economic achievement because of his determination to 
 a comment 
technically correct, since the federal government had provided means to 
the states to provide those schools, but one that essentially ignored the 
momentous Land-Grant College Act. 
 
60. Id. at 42. 
61. Id. at 53. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 54–55. 
64. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 915, 916 (1866) (veto message of Andrew 
Johnson). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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protect the Democratic Party from what he saw as the dangerously 
powerful Republicans.67
To construct attacks on this new Republican approach to 
governance, Johnson also fell back on traditional Democratic racism 
and growing opposition to the newly imposed taxes.
  He knew that, if they were allowed to go 
forward, the measures that he was killing would be widely popular in the 
South and the border states.  The bill promised to establish schools and 
homes for white refugees as well as black freedpeople.  Indeed, it looked 
rather like an effort to establish free-labor homesteads of educated 
Americans across the South, as the Republicans had tried to do across 
the North and West during the war. 
68  He ignored the 
bill’s benefits for white Southerners, and built up the idea that it was 
intended to give a handout to lazy African Americans, paid for by hard-
working white men.  According to Johnson, Congress had “never 
deemed itself authorized to expend the public money for the rent or 
purchase of homes for the thousands, not to say millions, of the white 
race, who are honestly toiling from day to day for their subsistence,” a 
conclusion he could only reach by a tortuous parsing of the popular 
Homestead Act.69  He went on to undermine the argument that 
homesteads and education benefited the entire country, instead insisting 
that the homestead provisions of the new bill were simply a “system for 
the support of indigent persons.”70  Why, he asked in a rhetorical 
question which misrepresented the bill, should the government do this 
for ex-slaves, when it had never done it for whites?  Freedmen should 
work hard to succeed, not look for handouts, he preached.71
Johnson went on to tie the proposed legislation to the idea that the 
Republicans were using tax money to create an army of partisan 
bureaucrats who would suck the nation’s new taxpayers dry.  The new 
requirements would cost more than $23 million, he insisted, and would 
create “an immense patronage,” including agents and officers and 
clerks, all of whom would suck up tax dollars.
 
72
Johnson’s equation—that government activism equaled special help 
for blacks paid for by hard-working taxpayers—became the equation 
that opponents of government activism have used ever since.  Johnson’s 
 
 
67. RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 54. 
68. Id. at 56–57. 
69. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 915, 916 (1866) (veto message). 
70. Id. 
71. Id.; see RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 55. 
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attack on the new Republican approach to government established a 
connection between racism and government activism that stretched far 
into the future.73
IV.  LINCOLN’S REFORM LEGACY 
 
And, in the short term, it seemed to work.  Lincoln Republicans 
responded to Johnson’s attack with shocked surprise.  Senator Lyman 
Trumbull of Illinois, one of the nation’s most distinguished 
constitutional lawyers, took Johnson’s argument apart point by point.74
Republicans in Congress tried to achieve their aims by falling back 
on wartime precedents.  They extended the 1862 Homestead Act to 
include public land in five Southern states, a plan that passed, this time, 
only by a party vote.
  
But men such as Trumbull could not muster the two-thirds vote 
necessary to override Johnson’s veto, and the homestead and education 
provisions were taken out of the new bill. 
75
They then went on to establish the Department of Education, using 
the precedent of the Department of Agriculture, to study education and 
make suggestions for its propagation, insisting that America could have 
neither liberty nor economic growth without education.  Democrats, in 
contrast, explicitly connected the bill to establish a Department of 
Education with the Freedmen’s Bureau bill and attacked it accordingly.  
It was simply a plan to provide Republican appointees with salaries, 
they charged, and it would interfere with states’ internal affairs, a 
complaint that was a code for their determination to maintain white 
racial supremacy.
 
76  A newspaper reporter from Savannah, Georgia, 
charged that radicals wanted to control education so that young 
Southerners of all races would be “taught to shoot in the right 
direction.”77
The bill for the Department of Education, too, passed by a party 
vote, with Republicans supporting the measure and Democrats 
opposing it, rather than by the bipartisan votes of the war years.
 
78
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turned out, the establishment of a department to study education was a 
weak substitute for actual schools.79
After Johnson’s attack, Republicans split between those determined 
to protect their party and hold onto government at all costs and those 
who continued to argue that the role of government was to advance the 
interests of average Americans, even if it meant sharing power with 
reform Democrats.  This split was completed in Grant’s term, when 
Grant moved to embrace machine politicians, notably those in the 
adjutant general’s office, for reasons unique to his presidency.
 
80  The 
straight Republicans followed Grant and cast their lot with traditional 
party politics.  In their 1872 platform, they explicitly endorsed the 
capitalists who funded their party war chest.81
But they did not speak for the whole party.  Liberal Republicans, as 
they called themselves (after the Lockean liberalism at the heart of the 
Declaration of Independence), split off from the party Republicans and 
tried to regain Lincoln’s politics of principle.
 
82  At their own political 
convention, they complained that the extreme partisanship of both 
Democrats and Republicans was destroying the nation and keeping it 
from progressing.  They castigated the “partisan tyranny” of traditional 
party politics and tried to break the power of party by calling for 
impartial civil servants to run government.  They endorsed the idea 
behind the Homestead Act, insisting that western land should go to 
“actual settlers” rather than railroad companies.  After the Chairman of 
the Committee on Platform read the platform, delegates cheered for 
“the Second Declaration of Independence.”83
Grant Republicans won the election in 1872, of course, and worked 
more and more closely with a rising industrial elite.
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they rejected popular measures to ease a severe recession and instead 
contracted the currency, a measure that hammered average Americans 
even as it pleased businessmen.85  The association of the Republicans 
with big business grew.  By 1890, with Benjamin Harrison in the White 
House thanks to the money of industrialists and Harrison’s men 
trumpeting that his would be a “BUSINESS MAN’S 
ADMINISTRATION,” it seemed that Lincoln’s hatred of politics to 
propagate an economic elite was dead.86
This was wrong.  In fact, reformers determined to use the 
government to advance the interests of average Americans have used 
Lincoln’s construction of a politics of principle ever since the 1860s.  
After the Harrison administration, Progressives began to insist that the 
government must cut ties to industrialists; their insistence helped to 
usher in the Progressive Era, the period when, not coincidentally, the 
Department of Education finally became active.
 
87
 
  Once established, this 
pattern has recurred throughout American history.  Just as opponents 
rely on racism and complaints of taxation, those calling for the 
government to level the economic playing field for all Americans use 
the example of Lincoln’s politics of principle.  Lincoln’s political legacy 
is that, ever since his day, reformers of all parties have tried to get the 
American government to work hard for hard-working Americans. 
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